<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Security on Ilya Rusalowski Hub</title><link>https://rivik.dev/categories/security/</link><description>Recent content in Security on Ilya Rusalowski Hub</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://rivik.dev/categories/security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>ykvault: Stop Storing API Tokens as Plaintext</title><link>https://rivik.dev/ykvault-stop-storing-api-tokens-as-plaintext/</link><pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://rivik.dev/ykvault-stop-storing-api-tokens-as-plaintext/</guid><description>Are you still keeping API tokens in ~/.secrets? Any app you install can read them. ykvault encrypts every secret with a YubiKey challenge-response key — each get/set requires a physical touch, and the encrypted files are useless without your key.</description></item><item><title>Hardware-backed SSH keys end to end: YubiKey, PIV, software alternatives, and where SSH CAs fit in</title><link>https://rivik.dev/hardware-backed-ssh-keys-end-to-end-yubikey-piv-software-alternatives-and-where-ssh-cas-fit-in/</link><pubDate>Sat, 09 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://rivik.dev/hardware-backed-ssh-keys-end-to-end-yubikey-piv-software-alternatives-and-where-ssh-cas-fit-in/</guid><description>A working guide to using a YubiKey for SSH on a real Linux fleet — the four knobs (resident, touch, PIN, agent), a four-mode policy for root and Ansible, software-only alternatives, and where SSH CAs fit in.</description></item><item><title>180 Breaches a Second: How Software Broke Its Promise, and the Radical Fix Hiding in Plain Sight</title><link>https://rivik.dev/180-breaches-a-second/</link><pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://rivik.dev/180-breaches-a-second/</guid><description>180 accounts are breached every second — and most of it comes down to reused passwords and missing MFA. A look at the software quality collapse behind the headlines, and why the fix is the same infrastructure-level move HTTPS once made: passkeys, on-device DLP, and capability-scoped AI agents.</description></item><item><title>When TLS 1.3 Silently Dies Inside Your Android Proxy</title><link>https://rivik.dev/when-tls-1.3-silently-dies-inside-your-android-proxy/</link><pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://rivik.dev/when-tls-1.3-silently-dies-inside-your-android-proxy/</guid><description>A post-mortem of intermittent HTTPS failures across a mobile proxy fleet: TLS 1.3 handshakes silently dying on memory-starved Android devices — large multi-packet handshake messages, inflated by post-quantum key shares, stressing proxy buffers under memory pressure.</description></item></channel></rss>